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DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ, #5743
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930725-CA
Priority No. 2

JAMES B. CASE,
Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(d)(Supp. 1991), whereby the defendant in a

circuit court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final order on a misdemeanor offense.

In this case

the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and
conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following rules, statues and
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended)
Amendment IV, United STates Constitution
Article I, § 7 and § 14, Utah Constitution

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

The broad, general description broadcast by radio
dispatch lacked sufficient detail or similarity to Mr.
Case and his situation to constitute reasonable suspicion
to stop his vehicle.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rpts. 3-7, (Utah 1994), the

Utah Supreme Court clarified that in reviewing reasonable suspicion
conclusions are reviewed for correctness.

JEd. at 6.

However,

because reasonable suspicion determinations involve the application
of law to fact requires that some measure of discretion is given to
the trial judge when applying the correction of error standard to
a set of facts. Id at 5.
The Supreme Court articulated

the standard of review

for

reasonable-suspicion determinations as follows:
We conclude that the proper standard of review to be
applied to a trial court determination of whether a
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion
is
a
determination
of
law
and
is
reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a
fact determination reviewable for clear error.[footnote
omitted] We further conclude that the reasonablesuspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure of
discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard
to a given set of facts. Precisely how much discretion
we cannot say, but we would not anticipate a close, de
novo review. On the other hand, a sufficiently careful
review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served, [footnote
omitted]
Id. at 6.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On September 24, 1992, the trial court heard James B. Case's
motion to suppress evidence obtained following the
3

stop of his

vehicle by a University of Utah police officer.
Suppress Transcript (hereafter MTr.) R.165.

See Motion to

Case argued that the

officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Case or his
passenger.

At the close of the evidence the trial court made

preliminary factual findings and requested that counsel file post
hearing memoranda. MTr. 20-21, R. 31-45, 46-50. The trial court
denied Mr. Case's motion to suppress on November 9, 1992. See
Ruling Transcript 198 (hereafter RTr.)

Written Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law were signed on December 23, 1992 and a
Supplemental Conclusions of Law was signed January 11, 1993. (A
copy of the trial judge's written findings and conclusions are
attached as addendum B) R.99-102, 104. On February 22, 1993, Mr.
Case entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to State v. Serv,
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), reserving the right to appeal the
issues raised at the suppression hearing.
stayed pending appeal. R. 125.

Sentencing was then

On September 7, 1993 this court

issued a ruling dismissing the appeal finding that a final judgment
had not been entered. R. 145.

Mr. Case was sentenced on October

14, 1993. R. 153. A Certificate of Probable Cause was granted and
imposition of sentence was stayed pending appeal. R. 149-150.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 26, 1992, a telephone caller, whose identity and
veracity were never established by the State, contacted
University of Utah police to allege a possible wrongdoing.
2,3,5,6.

the
MTr.

The details of the telephone conversation, however, were
4

not conveyed to the investigating officers. MTr. 3,5.

Police

dispatch merely claimed that there was a possible "car prowl" or
auto burglary in the 100 court area of the University Village. MTr.
5,6. The only additional detail provided to the officers, was the
sketchy description of a single individual suspect that broadly
targeted any and all "male[s], possibly Hispanic, chunky in build
and wearing

a white T-shirt."

MTr.

1,2,3.

No

car or other

individuals were mentioned by the dispatch report. MTr. 1-6.
In response to the report, Officer Bradfield arrived at the
100 court area where she briefly stopped a lone individual at the
scene. MTr. 15,16.

He appeared to be a "male, possibly Hispanic,

chunky in build wearing a white T-shirt" but he was able to escape
extensive police questioning. MTr. 16

As with Mr. Case and Mr.

Farnsworth, who were legitimately on the premises to drop off Mr.
Case's girlfriend at her home in the 800 court of the University
Village,

the

single

individual

also

apparently

had

a valid

justification for his whereabouts at the time. MTr. 7,8,16,19.
The parties do not dispute that appellant James Case looked
nothing like the reported suspect.

Mr. Case has short dark-brown

hair, is light and fair in complexion, weighs approximately 136
pounds, and is 5 feet 7 inches tall.

Officer LeFavre testified

that Mr. Case was not the individual described by the dispatch.
MTr. 4. Similarly, Mr. Case's cousin Richard Farnsworth, also was
unlike the individual, reportedly clothed in a white T-shirt.
Farnsworth wore a black leather jacket, which covered all but six
or seven inches of a pink T-shirt. MTr. 8,9,12.
5

The shirt had

"psychedelic colors across the top of it, a logo, pink and purple
logo on the right pocket," "it had deep purple sort of floral pink
and colors in there and gold as well."
were

MTr. 5.

Any white portions

either covered or contained narrowly in a band around a middle

section of the shirt. MTr. 5.

Throughout the motion to suppress

hearing, the trial judge and counsel for each party repeatedly
referred to the shirt as pink. MTr. 8,11,21.

As explained by the

lower court, on the night of the stop Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a
pink design T-shirt covered by a black leather jacket.

MTr. 12,

21, R. 100.
While police dispatch reported no concrete crime and only a
single individual on foot, Officer LeFavre nonetheless stopped two
individuals, James Case and passenger Richard Farnsworth, in a
car.1 MTr. 2.
resemble

the

Since, Office LeFavre admitted that Mr. Case did not
person

described

by

dispatch,

Mr.

Farnsworth's

Hispanic appearance appears to be the only basis for the stop.2
Other than Farnsworth's face, the officer could only see Richard's
black jacket and at best, pink shirt. While Richard may be "chunky
in build," the investigating officer had not yet realized Richard's
5 foot 6 inch, 184 pound stature because of Richard's position as
a

passenger

in

the

car

made

everything

unobservable

except

1

Officer LeFavre made no attempt to independently
corroborate any of the information provided in the dispatch. MTr.
2.
2

Interestingly, the trial court stated on the record that
Mr. Farnsworth was "clearly not hispanic [, ] " MTr. 20, 21, which
leaves the officer with no basis other than an unsubstantiated
hunch for stopping the vehicle.
6

Richard's face and shoulders. MTr. 2,7,9,10. Richard Farnsworth's
upper body was of course covered by the black leather coat. MTr. 9.
At the time of the stop, officers determined that Mr. Case and Mr.
Farnsworth did in fact have a valid reason for being in the
University of Utah Village.

MTr. 17.

The trial court made a

similar finding although it still determined that the officers
after the fact detection of alcohol was not improper.

Mr. Case

appeals the propriety of the initial stop and the baseless facts
upon which the officer relied.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Considered

in

the

"totality

of

the

circumstances"

the

information available to the officer stopping Mr. Case on June 26,
1992 did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.

The

officer responded to a vague dispatch based on an anonymous phone
call. The only information known to the officer at the time of the
stop was that there was a "possible car prowl" and the possible
suspect was described as "male, possible Hispanic, chunky in build
wearing a white T-shirt."

In spite of the officer's lack of

information he stopped Mr. Case and his passenger, prior to
attempting to corroborate any of the dispatch information.

The

officer did not observe any criminal wrong doing on the part of Mr.
Case or his passenger.
information

forming

In addition to the deficiencies in the

the basis

of

the

stop,

the

information

available to the officer and the description of Mr. Case and his
circumstances was not sufficiently similar to warrant the stop. By
the officer's own admission Mr. Case did not match the suspect
7

description, there were two individuals not one as in the dispatch,
they were in a vehicle which was not mentioned in the dispatch.
The officer testified that he stopped the vehicle based on the
passenger, Mr. Farnsworth's appearance.

However, Mr. Farnsworth

also did not match the dispatch description as he was wearing a
pink T-shirt covered by a leather jacket and was seated in a low
riding vehicle, not an individual on foot wearing a white T-shirt.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE BROAD, GENERAL DESCRIPTION BROADCAST BY RADIO DISPATCH
LACKED SUFFICIENT DETAIL OR SIMILARITY TO MR. CASE AND HIS
SITUATION TO CONSTITUTE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP HIS VEHICLE.
A. The Stop of Mr. Case and His Vehicle was a Level Two
Encounter Subject to Constitutional and Statutory Protections.
"It is well settled that a police officer's stop of a vehicle
is

a

'seizure'

protections."

and

therefore

subject

to

fourth

amendment

State v. Parker, 834 p.2d 592, 594 (Utah App. 1992)

(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 653

(1979)).

The

vehicular stop of Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth constituted a "level
two" encounter, an intrusion requiring a reasonable articulable
suspicion.

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616

curiam); Utah Code Ann.

(Utah 1987)

(per

§ 77-7-15. "Anything less would invite

intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
consistently refused to sanction.

And simple 'good faith on the

part of the arresting officer is not enough.'" Terry v. Ohio. 392
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) , quoted in State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88
(Utah App. 1987).
8

The Supreme Court has adopted a "totality of the circumstance"
test

to

be

applied

in

determining

whether

an

officer

had

"reasonable articulable suspicion" that the particular individual
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.

United States v. Cortez,

449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 328-29 (1990);
State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 1993) .
to be

"judged against an objective standard:

The facts are

would the facts

available to the officer at the moment of the seizure. . . 'warrant
a

[person] of reasonable caution in the belief7 that the action

taken was appropriate?"

State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah App.

1990).
B. The Anonymous Phone Call to the University of Utah Police Lacked
Necessary Detail and Specificity to Support Reasonable Suspicion to
Stop Based on the Resulting Dispatch Report.
The
uncertain

factual
and

deficiencies

unproven

nature

identity remains anonymous.

in

this

matter

of

the

source,

start
a

831 P.2d

1040, 1049 & n.16

must

provide

'enough

whose

indicia

See State v.

(Utah App. 1992),

Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987).
tip

caller

the

The State bears the burden of proving

that intrusion into a citizen's life was justified.
Lopez,

with

of

State v.

"[T]he source of the

reliability

to

justify'

interference with the privacy rights of a suspect." State v. White,
856 P. 2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) . In the present case the State bore
the burden of proving that the basis of the dispatch call was
sufficient to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.

The State

did not meet their burden, no evidence as to the identity of the

9

caller or what basis existed for the caller's information was
presented at the hearing.
A

police

office

can

establish

reasonable

suspicion

by

personally observing criminal activity, Sandy City v. Thorsness,
778 P.2d

1011, 1012(Utah App. 1989), or by receiving

information via radio broadcast.
646,650

(Utah 1989).

reliable

See State v. Bruce, 779 P. 2d

However, the information contained in the

bulletin must be supported by reasonable suspicion:
We conclude that, if a flyer or bulletin has been issued
on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that the wanted person has committed an
offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin
justifies a stop. . . If the flyer [or bulletin] has been
issued in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a
stop in the objective reliance upon it violates the
Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 650 (Citing United States v. Henslev, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33
(1985)).
"Reasonable suspicion . . . is dependent upon both the content
of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.
Both

factors

- quantity

and quality

- are

considered

totality of the circumstances - the whole picture."

in

the

Alabama v.

White, 496 U.S. 328, 330 (1990), State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 64950 (Utah 1989) (Police cannot rely on another person's unfounded
suspicions--even

if that person is another officer);

Black, 721 P.2d 842, 844
N.W.2d

659, 661

State v.

(Or. App. 1986); State v. Benson, 251

(Neb. 1977) .

The information provided to the

police must be objectively reliable to support the subsequent stop.
Black, 721 P. 2d at 844.

In Black, the Oregon Court of Appeals

ruled that a witness tip describing "a brown Ford Escort traveling
10

north on Highway 199, was speeding and weaving" was insufficient
dispatch information to justify a level II stop.3

The Oregon court

found that information relayed by the unidentified caller did not
form

"an

objective

basis

for

reasonably

suspecting

that

the

defendant had committed the crimes of DUI or reckless driving or
both" Id. at 844.
information

The court's inquiry focused on whether the

possessed

collectively

by

the

officer

and

the

dispatcher gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime had
been

committed.

Id.

See

also

Thorsness,

778

P. 2d

at

1012

(reasonable suspicion is determined from facts known to the officer
along with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts); State v.
Thompson, 231 Neb. 771, 438 N.W. 2d 131, 136 (1989) (emphasis in
original) ("a reasonably founded suspicion to stop a vehicle cannot
be based solely on the receipt by the stopping officer of a radio
dispatch to stop the described vehicle without any proof of the
factual foundation for the relayed message") ; Olson v. Commissioner
of Public Safety, 371 N.W. 2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985) (The court held
"If police can not stop a car. .on the basis of a mere whim, neither
can they stop on the basis, for all they know, or the mere whim of
an anonymous caller.") 4
3

The stopping officer in Black observed no erratic driving
patterns and noted that the vehicle was driving the speed limit.
Ms. Black was arrested and charged with driving under the influence
of intoxicants.
4

This Court has previously considered police stops based
on a phone tip from a known caller in State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). In addition to the fact that in Roth the
caller identified himself there are several other facts that
distinguish the present case from Roth. Roth involved a phone call
from hospital security informing police of an intoxicated male
11

The

appropriate

information
dispatcher

possessed
gave

rise

inquiry

for

collectively
to

this
by

a reasonable

court
the

is whether
officer

suspicion

of

and

the
the

criminal

activity. State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. App. 1986)

The

knowledge possessed by the dispatch and Officer LeFavre was simply
that there was a possible car prowl in the 100 court of the
University Village and that the suspect was
possibly Hispanic, wearing a white T-shirt."

"a chunky male,

At the time of the

stop Officer Lefavre had no personal knowledge of any facts
regarding criminal activity by Mr. Case or Mr. Farnsworth.

No

evidence existed as a basis for the allegation that a car prowl or
automobile burglary was in progress or about to take place.

In

fact, one officer testified that there was no evidence at the scene
that such a crime had occurred.

The scant information relayed to

the officer provided no basis to suspect criminal activity.

The

only information known to the officer was that there was an
unsubstantiated

report of a possible car prowl or automobile

burglary.
In the present case the reliability of the call is further
suspect in that the description of the individual and the crime
were vague.

There is no evidence before the court as to the

caller's veracity, the basis for the assumption that a crime was
driving and the caller provided police with the make, color and
license number of the car. Additionally the officer observed the
vehicle driving in a slow jerky manner, consistent with a drunk
driving pattern. In the case at bar, unlike in Roth the identity
of the caller is completely unknown, as is are any bias' the caller
may have had in providing the information.
12

being committed or motive for calling the police.5

There is no

basis to assume that the caller was the average citizen informant
and therefore inherently reliable.

Assuming that all calls to

police were from average citizen informants would encourage misuse
police and 911 services.

Such an assumption would allow persons

with unsure or misguided motives to pass information through the
emergency lines to cleanse the tainted information.

To prevent

misuse the dispatch operator must gather sufficient information to
ensure that there is reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring
or about to occur. If sufficient information cannot be gathered the
officer must attempt to corroborate the information.
In the present case no attempt was made to acquire additional
information regarding the caller or their information.
the

dispatch

report

was

not

based

on

reasonable

Therefore,
articulable

suspicion and the officer may not rely on the report to acquire
reasonable articulable suspicion.
C. The Dispatch Report was Overly Broad and Lacking in Articulable
Suspicion
Police radio broadcasts must be specifically narrow to provide
reasonable
description.

suspicion

to

stop

an

individual

matching

that

Commonwealth v. Cheek, 413 Mass. 492, 597 N.E.2d 1029

(Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1992) (The court held a dispatch

alerting

officers to be on the lookout for a "black male with a three5

In the case of State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661-62 (Utah
App. 1993) this court addressed the importance of "assessing the
reliability of third party tip[s].fl In discussing this issue the
court cited Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1973) for the
proposition
"that a known informer constituted a stronger
justification than an anonymous telephone tip.)
13

quarter length goose-down jacket" suspected in a stabbing was too
broad

to

provide

reasonable

suspicion.)

"To

permit

police

investigative stops under the sparse facts present in this case
[Cheek] would be to encourage unduly intrusive police practice."
See also Van Patten v. State, 697S.W.2d919 (Ark.App. 1985) (radio
dispatch providing "extremely general information about a xloud
party' and a 'brown jeep'" was too vague and based on insufficient
information to support a reasonable suspicion analysis.)
Similar to the facts in Cheek the description in the present
case, "a male, possibly Hispanic, chunky in build and wearing a
white T-shirt" is so broad it includes such a large spectrum of the
population that investigative stops based on this information would
allow offices to intrude on the rights of innocent citizens.

In

the present case no basis for the allegation of a car prowl was
presented.

The caller provided no details of the cars that had

been burglarized, or any facts as to the basis of their suspicions.
Certainly, appearing to be Hispanic and chunky while walking
through the University Village is not a crime.

Yet, this is all

the information available to support the allegation of criminal
activity.

Even if Mr. Farnsworth looked like the description

there was no reasonable suspicion that any crime occurred or was
occurring.
D. Mr. Case nor his Passenger Sufficiently Matched the Dispatch
Description to Warrant the Illegal Stop by the Officer

14

The issue of reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist has been
addressed by the Utah courts on numerous occasions,6 however, there
is

no

brightline

test

in

which

to

determine

the

degree

of

similarity between a suspect and a dispatch description necessary
to support an investigative stop.

State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592,

595 (Utah App. 1992) ("It is axiomatic that presence at or near the
[location], without

more, does not give rise

to a

reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity"); See also State v. Steward, 806
P. 2d 213 (Utah App. 1991) . Reasonable suspicion issues are highly
fact sensitive and must be carefully considered on the facts of
each individual case.

State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rpts 3(Utah

1994) .
Utah

case law addressing stops based on dispatch reports have

considered fact situation in which the officers had significantly
more

detailed

suspects.

accounts of the crimes and descriptions

of

the

See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1989), Pena,

232 Utah Adv. Rpts. 3-7, (Utah 1994).

Unlike the present matter,

Bruce and Pena each involve known citizen witnesses, who provided
the

basis

for

the

information

they

provided

for

the

police

dispatch, the descriptions were specific and specific criminal acts
were reported.
In Bruce the appearance of the individual stopped, the car and
individuals in the car were substantially similar to the broadcast

6

See State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1989); State v.
Swaniaan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), Sandv City v. Thorsness, 778
P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Truiillo 739 P.2d 85 (Utah
App. 1987); and State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988).
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description, the two matched on all points. The responding officer
stopped a orange Datsun station wagon with two black males in the
front

seat,

the

dispatch

description

was

"orange

Datsun

or

Volkswagen four-door sedan or station wagon with two black males
suspected of robbery, both riding in the front seat." id. at 648.
The description was provided to officers by a witness to a
convenience store robbery.

She and another witness provided

officers with additional details of the suspects and the crime that
were not relayed over the dispatch.
Unlike the present case, in Bruce the reporting witness and
the basis for her information were known to the dispatching
officers.

The facts currently before this court are at the

opposite end of the factual spectrum; two individuals were stopped
in a car exiting the University Village; the broadcast noted one
individual, apparently on foot in the 100 court of the University
Village, the officer's identified suspect was not Hispanic looking,
he was not wearing a white T-shirt, but a pink T-shirt and a black
leather jacket; and he was seated in a low riding car leaving those
outside the car with no way to assess his stature.
Similarly Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rpts. at 3-7, also illustrates
the inadequacies of the facts presently before the court. In Pena,
there was a known crime, the theft of prophylactics, and an
identified reporting witness, a 7-eleven clerk, with an identified
basis for the information, the clerks personal observations.

The

clerk provided a detailed description of the suspect and the
vehicle in which he was riding, including the license number. Id.
16

at 3.

In contrast, the

insufficiency

of

the dispatch

presently before the court cannot be overlooked.

report

The individual

providing information to the University Police Dispatch is unknown,
as is the basis of their information.

The caller, nor dispatch

provided a description of a vehicle, in fact there was no mention
of a vehicle in the description.
When officer LeFavre stopped Mr. Case he was on legitimate
business in a place open to the public that also happened to be in
the area of reported "possible" criminal activity.

This court has

held that this does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion
to stop.

In State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 officers engaged

in an investigation of drug activity stopped a truck driving into
the area of the investigation.

This court held, "The mere driving

of a pickup truck, on a public road, at 11:50, is insufficient,
without more, to raise reasonable suspicion that its occupant was
involved in criminal activity."

Mr. Case's actions were even less

suspicious than those of Mr. Steward, because Mr. Steward attempted
to leave the scene.
the officer.

Mr. Case stopped his vehicle when signaled by

Mr. Case at no time conducted himself in a manner

consistent with criminal activity.
give

rise

to

any

suspicion

that

The facts of this case do not
criminal

activity

occurred,

particularly, that Mr. Case or Mr. Farnsworth were engaged in any
criminal activity.

The officer had insufficient information and

the information that he did have was not sufficiently similar to
Mr.

Case or Mr. Farnsworth to stop them on

criminal activity.
17

suspicion of

any

There

are

several

discrepancies

between

the

dispatch

description and Mr. Case's circumstances. The fact that there was
no mention of a vehicle indicates that the caller was describing an
individual on foot.

Officer Bradfield made the more logical stop

of a lone pedestrian, rather than two individuals in a car.
Additionally, Mr. Farnsworth did not match the description of
"male, possibly Hispanic, chunky in build wearing a white T-shirt."
Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a pink T-shirt, covered by a leather
jacket, he was seated in a vehicle, obstructing his stature, and he
was with Mr. Case not alone or on foot.
The facts currently before this Court, considered in the
totality of the circumstances, do not support the officers alleged
reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth. Based on
the illegal stop of an individual who only vaguely resembled the
dispatch description in violation of the United States and Utah
constitutions and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 Mr. Case requests that
all evidence stemming from the stop be suppressed.7

7

"Absent reasonable suspicion, evidence derived from the stop
is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and must be excluded." State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v.
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988)). Thus, all evidence
gathered by Officer LeFavre after he stopped Mr. Case should be
suppressed.
18

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial absent the
illegally seized evidence.

Respectfully submitted this

Jb

day of May, 1994.

DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ
/<\^~
Attorney for Defendant/AppeTrfant
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ADDENDUM A

Q:

Did you or Rich get out of the car in the 100 court?

A:

Just me.

Q:

In 800 you got out of the car and where'd you walk?

A:

Just her to her door and back to the car and then leaving.

Q:

And Rich never got out of the car?

A:

No.

Q:

That's all.

JUDGE:

Cross.

ATP:

No, thank you.

JUDGE:

Nothing, you can have a seat.

ATD:

That will be everything for the defense.

JUDGE:

Alright, it's your motion so I'll give you that first

No, not in 100 in 800.

opportunity.
JUDGE:

Let me ask you this before you start.

The critical issue is

obviously and I'll be willing to find at this point, Mr. Farnworth
who was the passenger who may or may not have been the subject of the
dispatch is male with all due respect it's fair to describe him and I
would as chunky.

He has medium brown hair I wouldn't say that

- 20 -

it's dark brown hair.

He's clearly not Hispanic.

I'd be willing to

find based on his testimony nothing to controvert it that he was
wearing a pink t-shirt not a white t-shirt on the evening in
question.

That he was wearing a jacket that was zippered in the

front which would expose some of the front of the t-shirt, but that
he was covering the shirt with the jacket.

So based on those finding

I think that the evidence preponderates that way.

I guess the legal

question is and I'll also I further find that even though Mr. Case
and Mr. Farnworth had not stopped in the 100 Court even Mr. Case's
testimony was that they had to drive by 100 Court to get in and out
of the 800 Court area on their errand.

So I suppose the question is

how close does the description have to meet.

I think you would

stipulate wouldn't you counsel that if in fact Mr. Farnworth had been
Hispanic if he had been wearing a white t-shirt that if he were this
close to the 100 Court block then there would be reasonable
suspicion, is that correct?
ATD:

No, your honor, I wouldn't stipulate to that because I

believe they needed the dispatch tape here.

I believe the dispatch

tape has to be there has to be we need to know who this informant
was.

Was this an anonymous tip or is it a citizen's call.

They

allow her to, just a minute I have to get my bearings,
JUDGE:

Sure.

ATD:

If you look at there's a lot of case law around this state

and we need to determine is this an inherently reliable tip.

We

can't have citizen's using other people in this way and maybe they
wouldn't, but I think if you look at People v. Garcia, where an
- 21 -

anonymous tip calls and said so and so was leaving at 1:30 their
brown cars parked out in the back and there'll be 1/2 ounce of
cocaine under the hood.

Although the court ruled there was

reasonable suspicion there I think that's it's fraught with the
possibilities of a set-up.
where people do set-ups.

We see all kinds of domestic matters

I think that the dispatch office needs to

go a little further and determine who this person calling was.
There's been no evidence that this is a citizen's call.

I think if

we look at State v. Roth, that just came down from the Court of
Appeals, again there, they said there was reasonable suspicion
because they knew and they specifically stated that it was the
University of Utah Hospital Security Police.

Therefore, it had a

reliability because their job was to determine in Roth they gave a
description of the individual, the color of the car, the license
plates number of the car, the direction it would be traveling.
officer drove up and found it right there.

The

I think that there has to

be something further substantiating this in the totality of the
circumstances.

I think the officer has to have or if not the

dispatch officer has to have more information and more knowledge.
Cases that bear this out are Olsen v. The Commission of Public
Safety, which is a Minnesota case, 3 71 N.W.2d 552 and there it says
while their dispatch was in possession of specific and articulable
facts supporting reasonable suspicion is essential.
was a DUI.

In this case was are the articulable facts that a car

prowl occurred?
Court.

In that case it

All we know is that there was someone out in the 100

I don't believe that that's reasonable suspicion.
- 22 -

We

could have anytime we see someone on the street we could call the
police and the police would haves to come out.

Maybe the dispatch

office knew that, but the City has not presented or bore their burden
on that.

In City of Wake Forest v. Ducran, again, they said it's the

burden of the facts the burden lies on the officer, the facts
available to the officer.

You heard him testify all he knew is a

chunky individual, Hispanic looking, with a white t-shirt.

Well,

maybe if we mix the two my client and Rich you might get that
description but separately we have a chunky individual wearing a pink
t-shirt and to my eye he doesn't look Hispanic to me.

I have other

cases if the court wants them, but the continuing theme is we have
specific cars, specific colors, specific suspect identification and
drivers licenses and most of these are DUI cases, and a driving
pattern or something more.
behavior.
ATP:

Absent the driving pattern or criminal

The courts have overturned it said, we must suppress.

All of the cases she has cited to, your honor, refer to

stopping the individual that they intended to stop, subsequently
arresting him on the charge that the call was made on.
we're not anywhere near that.

In this case

They stopped on an investigative stop

based on a reasonable call from an individual stating someone is out
in my parking lot.

If she expects that the court should require

citizen's screenings to be dealt with in the same fashion that a
prosecutor deals with screenings.

She's missed the mark.

court case out there that says that.

There's no

The dispatcher has a duty to

determine the inherent reliability, the reliability of the call to
the best of their ability.

Over the telephone that's very
- 23 -

simple.

Somebody is committing a crime, could you investigate it?

They didn't arrest anybody.

They went and investigated.

Based on

that investigative stop, they determined that an individual that was
in close proximity to the person they wanted to question was in fact
under the influence of alcohol.
any respect.

Their stop was not questionable in

They had from two officers testimony an individual who

fit in their opinions the descriptions that had been dispatched.

The

officers had subjective

SIDE B cont.

articulable facts which caused the stop.
chunky individual wearing a white t-shirt.

In this case they had a
The court indicated there

was no evidence that he wasn't wearing a jacket.

I would proffer to

the court Officer LaFavre did indicate that the individual was in a
t-shirt only that there was no jacket involved.

I would also

indicate that the defendant's appearance at 3:00 o'clock in the
morning is close enough to Hispanic that their subjective opinion is
what the court has to look at not what we here in the light of day
can see, but what they a car passing by them leaving the area that
they're going to investigate would perceive.

It's their perception

and it is their perception that of a reasonable officer.
officers here both testifying to the same thing.

We have two

That's the standard

the court has to look to is what they performed here reasonable and
would another officer under the similar circumstances.
the Utah State law is.
- 24 -

That's what

Would another officer under similar circumstances have responded in a
like fashion.

I don't think there's any evidence at all before this

court to indicate otherwise.

They both testified to the light

colored t-shirt, they both believe it was a white t-shirt.

And given

that that is the state of the law right now in Utah I don't believe
the court has any choice but to find there was reasonable suspicion
for the stop.
ATD:

Your honor, Mr. Zollinger is asking you to give more

credibility to the officers.

In every jury trial we ask can you

equally weigh the evidence.

I don't believe the officers' testimony

is any more credible than Mr. than Rich's.
that he lies.

Rich, there's no evidence

There's nothing to doubt his credibility.

Further, I

think Roth our most recent Court of Appeals decision discusses the
reliability of the informant.
the informant was reliable.
informant.

It goes into discussing why in Roth

We don't know anything about this

The Oregon Supreme Court stated:

We hold that an anonymous tip in this case has to have some
inditia of reliability in order for it to give rise to
reasonable suspicion.

I sense the overtones of Mr. Zollinger's argument is that this
something less than reasonable suspicion we need.

It's not.

to be reasonable suspicion and I just don't think its here.

It has
Even

based on the facts if you want to skip the dispatch argument Rich
does not look Hispanic, he was wearing a pink t-shirt and he was
- 25 -

wearing a black leather jacket.
There's no reason to lie.
suspicion argument.

He's not prepped in the law.

He didn't understand the reasonable

I just think even absent the argument on

dispatch and if you want more I'm sorry I didn't write a memoranda on
this as requested, however, I got the discovery yesterday and rather
than put this off I tried to work from there.

I would be glad to

brief this for the court on the issue of whether the reliability of
the informant.

You don't have a dispatch tape here.

He said a

citizen called and said there's a person in my yard or in my courtho,
or my parking lot.

I didn't hear that in the evidence at all.

That's it.
JUDGE:

It seems to me there are two issues, we probably need to

look at both of them.

I guess this isn't a tip situation, this is a

caller inherently anyway.

The reasonable inference is someone

complained about a car prowler and the officers were called to
investigate and I guess the first issue is seems to me your question
before the officers can stop anybody in response to a dispatch call
they have to have a certain amount of information.

And I guess the

question is how much information do they have to have.

If someone

calls and reports a car prowl or a car burglary which is what a car
prowl is, before the officer can stop anybody I guess they have to
have a certain amount of information.

What is that?

A quantum of

informat ion you have to have that seems to me to be the first issue
and then the second issue is before a stop can be reasonable how
closely to the description much the subject of the stop fit?
Obviously officers can't go out when they're given a description of
- 26 -

the suspect and stop just anybody.

If the stop isn't reasonable I

would think both sides would agree to that.

Even in their own minds

they have some subjective reason for thinking gee maybe this person's
it even though he a lot different or she's a lot different from the
person that was described, the stop wouldn't be reasonable.

There

has to be some objective standard to look at in saying no this was
the description given, this is the description of the subject of the
stop, how closely do they have to match?
any case that talks about that.

And I'm not familiar with

That would seem to me to be the

focus of your research and I'd ask you if you would counsel to
prepare something and have it ready by let's see, the trial is set
for October the 14th so I'll ask you to be ready with something let's
say October the 5th and then Mr. Zollinger you can respond by the
13th.

We won't have time to have a reply memorandum submitted.

But

to focus on those two issues, and as I said the second one is my main
concern because this isn't really a tip this isn't someone calling
the police and saying hey look if you stop Mr. so and so you're going
to find some drugs.

This is an actual call a complaint and it has

more of an emergency overtone and it would seem to me the police need
a lot less information before they can investigate that than they
would just that kind of a tip that it maybe your cases Ms. Kreeck
Mendez that you've referred to would deal with.

But if you want to

look at that issue too.
ATD:

Alright.

JUDGE:

So the deadlines are October the 5th and October the 13 for

a reply and then I'll give you my ruling sometime prior to the trial
and I suppose it may be dispositive depending on how I go.
- 27 -

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT
&

Plaintiff,

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Case No. 925018713

JAMES B. CASE,
Judge Robin W. Reese
Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On June 26, 1992, University of Utah Police Officer LeFevre was dispatched

to a suspected car prowl, or vehicle burglary, in a common parking area at the 100
court of the University Village sometime after midnight.
2.

The dispatcher gave Officer LeFevre the following description of the suspect:

a chunky male, possibly Hispanic, wearing a white t-shirt. These were the only
details provided by the dispatcher.
3.

The officer did not know who had phoned in the complaint.

4.

When approaching the University Village shortly after the dispatch the

officer saw a car with a passenger who, in the officer's judgment, appeared to
match the description of the dispatch. The passenger appeared to be chunky, and
hispanic, and was wearing a light t-shirt

5.

At the time the officer first observed the car and the passenger they were

not in the 100 court area, but could have been driving away from that location.
6.

The officer stopped the car near the entrance to University Village on

Sunnyside Boulevard.
7.

After the officer stopped the car he approached the passenger, who had

given rise to the officer's first suspicion. The passenger was a man by the name
of Richard Farnsworth.
8.

Mr. Farnsworth is: male; fits the description of chunky, approximately 5'6*\

184 lbs.; and has brown hair which is moderate to dark. Farnsworth is not
hispanic.
9.

At the time of the stop, Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a pink t-shirt which

was covered by dark leather jacket, the jacket was partially zipped. The upper
part of the t-shirt would have been visible to the officer, even though Mr.
Farnsworth was seated.
10.

The officer who stopped Mr. Farnsworth thought he was stopping the

subject of the earlier dispatch.
11.

Based on the description that the officer had received, it was reasonable to

think that the vehicle he was stopping contained the subject of the dispatch.
12.

The driver of the car that Mr. Farnsworth was riding in was Mr. Case.

13.

Mr. Case was arrested subsequently for Driving Under the Influence of

Alcohol after other evidence which was in plain view and plain smell gave rise to
additional suspicions which the officer then acted upon.
14.

Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were at the University Village on legitimate

business- They had not burglarized any vehicles.
15.

Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were originally in the 800 court area of the

University Village, but did drive near the 100 court area of the University Village
when exiting the area.
16.

Mr. Farnsworth did not actually get out of the car while at the University

Village.
17.

The officer's detention of Farnsworth was brief.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The officer did not use the dispatch as a pretext to stop the vehicle. He

thought that he was stopping the subject of the dispatch.
2.

The officer's stop of the vehicle was based on objective articulable facts

such that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the passenger, Farnsworth,
was involved in criminal activity. The passenger's appearance, and proximity to
the reported criminal activity, gave rise to that suspicion.

DATED this lZj>

day of December, 1992.

Robin W. Reese
Third Circuit Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to Deborah Kreeck
Mendez, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and Stephen P. Zollinger, Salt Lake City Prosecutor's
Office, 451 South 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 this
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JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE

JAMES B. CASE
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
3.

The dispatch provided sufficient information on which
an officer could base reasonable suspicion to arrest
someone matching the dispatch description.
Specifically, the dispatch included:

and
DATED this

1)

alleged crime a car prowl,

2)

location of the car prowl,

3)

information regarding the suspect.

I '

day of January, 1993.
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ADDENDUM B

UXAH

u u u n u* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

W.7-15. Authority of peace officer to «to«

.„,

A peace officer may stoo anv « * « Z 7 ^

™

^

name, addreas and an explanation of h t

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.)
The right of the people to be secure in their p«
sons, houses, papers, and effects* against unncaMC
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, as:
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable SUM
supported by Oath or iffim**™* and parucubrH
dosrritiinf the place to be searched, and the penea
er things to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec 7. [Due process of lawj

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or propvm
erty, without due process of law.

Sec 14. (Unreasonable searches forbidden «.
Issuance of warrant.]
"*
Hie right of the people to be secure in thf-tr i^.
sons, houses, papers and effects against u n m i ^ .t,;'
searches and seizures shall not be violated. ^j± »
warrant shall issue but upon probable cau~ ^ /
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly drrrH^
the place to be searched. and the person or thine wi»

